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What Type of Decentralization? 
"Decentralization" is a label that is put on many bottles. '"Decentralization may 
mean everything from "deconcentration" I where the Central Government exerts 
its powers through satellites scattered around in the country; via 11 delegation 11 , 
where the Central Government keeps control, but temporarily lends its power to 
subordinate units; to genuine "devolution" I where the local governments have 
powers to make their own binding decisions which cannot be reversed by any 
superior authority as long as they are consistent with the law I and where they 
have financial means of their own that cannot be taken away from them. 
In this paper I will base my considerations on "devolution':.. The reason for this 
is not that it is the most usual version of decentralization, since this is not the 
case. Neither in Africa nor in any other continent. Genuine devolution of powers 
is found only in a few of the smaller European nations; countries with peaceful 
recent history and a well established, long democratic traditions, such as Switzer-
land and the Nordic countries. In other countries, not least the former colonial 
powers, deconcentration and delegation are the preferred forms of decentraliza-
tion. 
Nevertheless, I have prefurred to base my presentation on genuine devolution. 
' One reason for this is, that devolution is what decentralization in Uganda aims at. 
In several announcements, the President as well as the Government have 
confessed their commitment to genuine decentralization. 
Another, and also very important reason for choosing devolution as my basis is 
that this to me seems to be most consistent with the underlying motives behind the 
growing interest for decentralization in the third world. Decentralization is no aim 
in itself. It is a natural consequence of the present stage of development, and in 
many countries decentralization is a precondition for further development, just 
as it is expressed in the preamble of this conference. Why is it so? 
In earlier stages the major function of the government was that of protecting the 
external boundaries and the internal law and order. This called for centralization 
of power. But at the stage of development, which has now been achieved in most 
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African countries, provision of services such as education, health, care of the 
old, the handicapped and the sick has become mo{e and more a concern of the 
government. The reason for this is that those social formations which used to 
perform these tasks, the extended family and the local community, have 
undergone profound changes and are no longer able to take the whole respon-
sibility for these vital functions. To a large degree Non Governmental Or-
ganizations have taken over with much success, but putting everything on their 
shoulders is the same as being totally dependant on donor funds and excluding the 
local communities from any responsibility for vital parts of their life and survival 
as communities. So in the long run government has to take responsibility for the 
stable financing and delivery of a substantial part of such services, partly by 
collaborating with private donors, partly by delivering the services itself. 
This task, however, cannot be done properly by the central state. The necessary 
flexibility and adaptation to local needs and circumstances demands a local 
administration and local popular control with the priorities and with the 
administration. 
Such popular control and involvement is also in line with the idea, that in many 
countries peoples' involvement and feeling of responsibility for their own future 
is a precondition for developmental take off. Decentralization can only contribute 
to this if it implies real devolution of substantial powers. 
And finally many people have come to doubt, whether the traditional strong 
central state is the best way of preserving the unity of the ethnical and cultural 
heterogeneous nations of the third world. Practical experience has demonstrated 
that it has often led to bloody suppression and upheavals. May be it is time to 
consider the opposite method. 
Thus a wish for flexible services, involvement of the common people and their 
participation in the process of development and the peaceful preservation of 
national unity call for devolution rather than deconcentration. 
But what does that imply? 
lmpllcations of Devolution. 
Involvement of the local people is the nucleus of decentralization, if the intentions 
mentioned shall be fulfilled. This means that the representatives of the local 
people must have the final word in all decisions about the services which are 
decentralized in the law. Only questions of lawfulness should be open to appeal 
to a superior legal authority. Ministers or officials from Central Government can 
define the limits of local decisions by general regulations, where and when the law 
empowers them to do so. But these limits must be broad enough to give scope for 
much freedom of action. As long as the local authorities respect such limits, they 
are allowed to be autonomous. They shall not apply for resources, their decisions 
shall not be subject to any accept or approval by any higher administrative or 
political authority. Neither should anyone be allowed to reverse the lawful 
decisions of the local authorities. Only if these conditions of autonomy are 
fulfilled, one can demand the local authorities to take the full legal and politi~ 
responsibility for their decisions. Only then the voters will be able to demand 
every decision to be explained to them by their elected representatives. Only then 
there will be transparency which enables the tax payers to visualize clearly the 
benefits which they get in return for their sacrifices. Only then we can expect 
real involvement of the common people in the management of their local com-
munities. 
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Such autonomy has consequences for the systems of finance that come to govern 
the local authorities. Freedom to make their own choices and priorities is worth 
nothing if the local authorities must beg for 'every shilling by a superior 
authority, or when their budgets mnst be approved by somebody else, or if they 
do not have access to sufficient funds. 
The other side of autonomy I however, is that autonomy also demands that the local 
authorities take the financial responsibility for their decisions. Autonomous 
authorities should not be allowed just to pass the bill to somebody else. In order 
to achieve this, a financial system is necessary I which is transparent enough to 
demonstrate clearly the links between decisions on expenditures and decisions 
related to finances. 
Local Taxation for Local ~~-.... 
The most obvious way of providing lccal governments with resources I is to put 
some sources of taxation at t he disposal of local governments. 
This way of establishing a basis for financing the local government's services has 
many advantages I above all that of providing maximum transparency and popular 
control over the tax money. The tax-payers have the possibility of knowing 
exactly. what their taxes are being used for. Literally, financing by local taxation 
w:i11 enable them to see with their own e:tes the schools I the roads, the hospitals, 
which they got in return for their tax~s. It is easy to explain to them what will be 
the consequences of lowe...~g the tax pressure or of increasing service demands. 
The locally elected councillors are directly rospm~sible to their voters, they are 
unable to lay blame on the bad will or foolishness of higher authorities; more 
remote from the voters. 'I he voters can, through local debates or referenda. be 
directly involved in setting priorities for the distribution of expenditures among 
the various local purpo£~. These clear I visible ties between public income and 
expenditures provide an :deal background for the development of democratic 
attitudes and behaviour. 
For various reasons. local taxation I however, has limitations as a source of income 
for local authorities in most third world countries: 
1. For technical reasons. some taxes ··are not suitable for local 
taxation. This applies in particular to all kinds of indirect 
taxation: e.g. employers • contributions, customs I duties and 
tariffs, Value Added Tax etc. - i.e. some of the most profitable 
taxes. Theses taxes tap the production at the spots, where the 
money is most visible and therefore most difficult to escape. 
2. In developing coun tries, most of the local economy, especially in 
rural dist..."'icts, is informal, i.e. the production comes only 
sporadicaliy to the s urface , to a point where the money becomes 
visible (and the.r:ef .. :rre taxable ) to the authorities. Generally, in an 
informal economy, t r.2 efficiency of taxation depends very much 
upon the ~.o.-:2J "s-xial contr.J l '1 I i.e. the extent to which the local 
population r cy..:.c ts ne:].:,~~:ve.;.y upon tax evasion. Such social control 
can only develcp in an envi_ro:"mcnt of transparency and public 
support for the :?U blic s ector . We have- in our many meetings with 
local councillor~ - a g.sir; ar d agc..tn been told, that the potentialities 
for local taxation ext 1t , but they that will materialize only when the 
benefits of tax- ':)aying b<:'COF\e clearly visible to the local popula-
tions. This will only happen if t he units of local governments are 
relatively small. 
' 3. Some of the tax~ wh.ich are most suited to local taxation - i.e. 
market dl,Jes ,__~.?.:P...9...rt tagffs_, licenses_are counterproductive if they 
are raised beyond certain levels . , 
4. Local ~xation may have adverse distributional effects. There is 
normally a close negative correlation between the economic wealth 
of a locality and the need for public services. 
For all these reasons it is hard to imagine a situation in any near future, where 
the local authorities in typical third world countries, like Uganda, will be able to 
finance their projected services by local taxation alone. 
Transfers from Central to Local Government. 
In a decentralized system with genuine autonomy at lower levels, the Central 
Government abjures exerting control over the lower authorities by means of 
intervening in their concrete decisions. This, however, does not mean that 
Central Government renounces any control at all. Of course, no Central 
Government can give up the power to regulate activities at lower levels in order 
to obtain harmonization of strategies and - not least - to economize in the use of 
the nation's scarce resources. But it has to make use of instruments other than 
that of intervening directly in the lower councils' specific decisions and arran-
gements. 
On the other hand, the Central Gmrernment cannot simply pass the obligations to 
execute certain tasks and t o deliver certain services to lower authorities without 
providing them with m~ns and resources to carry out these responsibilities. That 
would only cause chaos and irresponsibility at the lower levels. 
This means that some arrangements have to be established for transfers of 
resources from the Central Government to the Local Governments. 
There are three very different techniques which are used for that purpose in 
various countries: 
Transfers b§sed on Approved Bud~j:s. 
One method, which is often used in systems which are not devolutioned but 
deconcentrated, is to base the transfers on approved budgets of the local govern-
ments. Under this system, each local government must produce each year a 
budget covering the expenditures which it considers necessary to perform the 
decentra.lized tasks, minus the expected revenue of local taxes. These budgets 
have to be approved by the Central Government and will consequently be under 
central control, even in details . Such estimates, however, will depend on the 
standards which each local gove-rnment sets up for its services. Based on the 
assumption that the Mintstry of Finance will probably often cut in the local 
budgets, but never r -ej_se the es::imates of budget, the local governments will be 
encouraged to do tactical budg"';ting by expanding their estimates beyond their 
actual needs. Similarly they will attempt to maximize the grants either by 
underestimating the revenues of t he local taxes or by not collecting them 
efficiently. This in turn will compel the Ministry of Finance to do what the local 
governments have already been expecting: Namely to cut the budgets. In which 
way? A Q!:Q2Qrtlonal r ed uction will reward those local authorities which have 
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budgeted for the highest standards for their services, and will punish those 
authorities which have set more modest or realistic standards. In the long run this 
will result in even more "tactic budgeting" and l~d to quite unrealistic expen-
diture estimates in the local governments, thereby severely disturbing the pos-
sibility of conducting a realistic macroeconomic policy. Therefore the Ministry of 
Finance will sooner or later be obliged to leave the principle of proportionate 
reductions. Instead it has to make its own assessment of the acceptability of the 
estimates of each local unit- or alternatively to set up general guidelines for the 
standard of the services throughout the country. Whether the Ministry chooses 
one or the other of these alternatives, the result will be in serious conflict with 
the autonomy of the lt:X:al councils to make their own priorities among the various 
fields of expenditures. So to base the transfers on approved budgets will not be 
consistent with any real devolution of powers to the local authorities. 
Using reimbursements has been one of the most common methods of transferrtng 
resources from Central to local governments. There are many reasons why it has 
been so popular. At f irst glance, it seems very fair and simple: As the tasks are 
transferred to the local governments, it appears natural to many people, that the 
central gove..."'"llment should continue to pay a proportion of these expenditures in 
each local unit. Moreover , from a supEtrficial point of view, it appears to be fair 
that those councils which fulfil their duties and thus actually spend the money for 
the decentralized services , get more in reimbursements than those councils which 
do not fulfil their new dutiEs. 
In recent times, however, tl1ose countries which used to make the most extensive 
use of proportional rei.Inbursements, are increasingly abandoning this method in 
favour of block grants. The reason is that more and more negative side-effects 
have become apparent. Above all it has proved difficult to harmonize a system of 
reimbursements of local expenditures with overall financial control, unless direct 
control - which is incompatibl2 with devolution - of the administration of the 
services is introduced . Under a ::;ystem of reimbursements the total sum of local 
expenditures determine the total transfer from the central to the local govern-
ments, regardless of the national financial situation. This is enough to erode 
every attempt of pursuing a responsible macroeconomic policy. Moreover, 
reimbursement of expenditures encourages spending. Under financial constraints 
this makes a difficult task even more difficult for those responsible for the 
national budget. 
Another problem is the adverse distributional effects of such reimbursements. 
Contrary to the belief of many people, reimbursements favour the rich local 
governments at the expense of the poor ones. This is due to the fact that the level 
of expenditures in a local unit does not only reflect the need, but also the amount 
of money available for spending. Reimbursements tend to favour the rich local 
units at the expense of the poor ones. The higher the reimbursement percent, the 
more will the wealthy units be favoured. 
If reimbursements are nevertheless used, it must be stressed that the percentages 
need not be the same for all kinds of services. On the contrary! Perhaps the most 
valid arguments for reimbursements in at genuinely decentralized system is that 
in that way the Central Government can to some degree impose its own priorities 
on the decisions of the lower adm.L.-llstrative units without intervening in the 
individual decisions. By giving high reimbursements on those expenditures which 
it favours, the Central Government makes spending on these services more 
attractive to the lower units that other expenditures. This point of view is 
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especially relevant if the Central Government wants to introduce a compulsory 
minimum standards on specific services, for instance a minimum number of home 
nurses per 1000 inhabitants in all local units. In that case the logical solution is 
to give 100 percent reimbursements of the expenditures on the services up to the 
defined minimum, and a lower or none reimbursement on the extra services which 
are provided above the minimum standard. 
Block Grants. 
Reimbursement of actual expenditures as well as transfers on the basis of 
approved budgets are examples of conditioned transfers. The money is only 
transferred to the local governments on the condition that they are spent on 
expenditures which the Central Government approves. They limit the freedom of 
the local authorities to spend the money according to their own priorities, based 
on their judgment of the local needs. So they differ from transfers given as 
unconditioned grants, also called ~block grants". These are given as periodical 
lump sums to the local authorities to be used as they find most useful. 
This ·of course does not mean that there are no restrictions at all. 
The local authorities are bound by the law. They can only spend 
the money on legal purposes. But they can choose freely among a 
plethora of legal options. 
Block grants take their point of departure from the total amount which has to be 
transferred from Central Government to the local governments. There is no 
scientific basis for determining the total amount to be distributed as block grants. 
This has to be the result of a political balancing of factors against each other: The 
available financial resources of the nation versus the standard of services which 
are desirable in the local units. May be we can make the assumption that, at least 
at the beginning of decentralization I the transfer of tasks and responsibilities 
does not intend to reduce the quality or quantity of the services as compared with 
their standard when previously administered by the Central Government. Given 
this assumption we can define the initial minimum transfers to be given as block 
grants as the total sum previously used before decentralization by the line 
ministries and institutions of the Central Government for the services which are 
transferred. Of course a higher total sum can be decided, at the initial stage of 
decentralization as well as later on, retlectlng a desire for increasing standards 
of services and/or improved economic possibilities. 
Once this amount has been determined, it has to be distributed among the local 
authorities according to some objective criteria which reflect the need for services 
and the financial strength of each local authority. When the need for transfers of 
each local unit is reflected in the objective criteria in the formula for block grant, 
each local government does not have to document its need for transfers by making 
expenditure estimates. 
Thus the size of the transfer via block grant is given externally for each council. 
Therefore the budgeting procedure at local level will not start by making estimates 
of expenditures I but by making estimates of incomes, based on expected revenues 
of local income sources and the externally given block grant. The total amount 
thus available then has to be distributed among the various areas of expenditure. 
This will present itself as a matter of priorities, and there will be no scope for 
tactical budgeting. Financing local expenditures by local tax revenues and block 
grants based on objective criteria stimulates economic accountability and 
responsibility of the local councils and administrations by making the scarcity of 
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the resources visible and by making t he task of econ :nni'7j_ng witb. these scarce 
resources imperative. 
' To the extent resources are transferred as block grants, t here will be no 
earmarking of the money. It is put at the free disposal of the local council to be 
used according to the priorities of the local Resistance Council. Thus, in ~ntrast 
to expenditure sharing, bloc~ants create no conflict ~tween,_local autonomy 
and macroeconomic poljcy. 
Criteria for Block Grants. 
So we have to determine how the block grants should be distributed among the 
local authorities. One rather tempting idea would be to use t he size of the 
population as the sole criterion, i.e. to give equal amounts for local use for each 
citizen1 • Contrary to the intentions, however, this would not render all local 
units equal. Some of the local units have greater needs than others because of, 
for instance a scattered population, a high number of school children, high 
morbidity rates, etc. So equal block grants per inhabitants would allow a lower 
standard of services in some units than in others. In the same way some local 
authorities have better taxing powers than others if their populations are 
wealthier. Here again equal grants would leave them with unequal standards. 
To these problems some discussants have responded that we might simply use the 
amount of services available or the actual expenditures as criteria . But this is just 
another way of reimbursing part of their expenditures and thus to open up for 
tactical budgeting, and to favour the wealth }or local governments at the expense 
of the poorer ones. 
What we need is some criteria which on the one hand ren ect the need for services 
and the local taxing power, without at the same time be:ing r esponsive to the actual 
or former spending of the local authorities (or the local distrtbution of the 
previousexpenditures of the Central Government). To givea.n example: The need 
for school services depends very much on the number of children at school age. 
Thus this number is an exact indicator of the need for schools and therefore an 
appropriate criterion for block grants. As a contrast: The actual number of actual 
school children is an inappropriate criterion, since it does not include those 
children who have not got a place in a school. This criterion therefore favours 
those local councils that have established schools for everybody at the expense 
of those local communities who have only partially covered the need. The point is 
that the number of schools children as criterion does not distinguish whether an 
insufficient coverage is caused by the council giving low priorities to schools or 
to lack of money. 
In many countries which use block grants, and v1hich have well established data 
systems, specified down to local levels, the selec+-J on of crite:da as well as the 
determination of weights assigned to them will often be decided on the basis of 
thorough statistical correlation analysis. This js hardl y possible in any third 
world country. The choice of criteria as well as weighting must therefore 
inevitably rest upon common judgment as to what are the factors that determine 
need for services in a third world context. Such choice cannot avoid being rather 
2 This, of course, is also the Case, wh~'l "need" is meas ured in terms of the 
difference between the national average expenditure per inhabitant and the 
corresponding figure for the local unit. 
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' arbitrary. But simplicity of the formula should have preference over a seeming 
precision, which is anyw~illusory. 
In Uganda the most important services which will be transferred to the local 
authorities are: Primary and secondary education, preventive and curative health 
services and local feeder roads. So we need some objective criteria which reflect 
the local need for these services. The group of consultants of which I am a 
member, has proposed the following criteria: 
1. The number of children at school age within each community; to indicate 
the need for primary and secondary education . 
2. The rate of mortality within the local jurisdiction; to indicate the need 
for health measures. This is chosen instead of the most obvious indicator 
which is the rate of mortality. It will be difficult to provide reliable data 
on both, but certainly much easier for the rate of mortality than for the 
rate of morbidity. 
3. The number of acres of area in the community per inhabitant; to 
indicate the need for all kinds of infrastructure, including feeder roads 
and regional roads. 
We have proposed that these three criteria be given equal weights, because we 
have no basis for discriminating among them. 
So we propose these three criteria to indicate the varying need for the most 
important public services. But to be fair to all districts we also need an indicator 
of the taxing power of the local authority. Here we suggest the total production 
of all goods and services in the district per capita, in other words the GDP per 
capita. The relationship between this indicator and the size of the block grant, 
however, should be constructed in such a way that, the higher the GDP per 
capita, the lower the block grant. Therefore the criterion which we have 
suggested is: The reciprocal of the GDP per capita in the local government area. 
Arbitrarily we have proposed that the need for services should have 60 percent 
weight in the formula for block grants and the taxing power 40 percent. The final 
criteria and their weights appear from the table below: 
Objectiye Criteria and Weights for the Sharing of Block Grants. 
1. Number of Children at School Age in 20% 
Percent of Total Population 
2. Rate of Mortality 20% 
3. Number of Acres per Inhabitant 20% 
4. Reciprocal of total Production per Capita 40% 
Total 100% 
/ 
It should be emphasized that by means of these weights and criteria we do not 
calculate the shares of the local authorities, but llie share per 1nhab1tant in each 
local unit.) 
This way of calculating the block grants serves several purposes: 1) to transfer 
money in such a way that tactical budgeting is exduded and regard is taken to 
macroeconomic considerations, 2) to relate the size of the block grant to each local 
government to its specific the need for services, and 3) to equalize unequal 
economic opportunities among the local communities. All these considerations are 
vital to the success of the decentralization. 
Private Ponat19DS~ 
As I mentioned in the beginning, private donations, primarily from NGOs, are 
playing a big role in the delivery of services in many third world countries. In 
many places NGOs are more important service providers than the public sector. 
Under such circumstances it could be maintained that it makes little difference 
whether that small part of the services , which is publicly financed I is delivered 
by the state or by the local governments. The answer to this is that decentrali-
zation is a precondition for an increasing involvement the local population in the 
delivery and financing of the services they consume. 
But if this is accepted, shouldn't then the local and regional differences in the 
amount of NGO financed services somehow be reflected in the size of the block 
grants to the individual local governments? Certainly these differences in private 
donations cause local differences in the standard of services; just as differences 
in taxing power cause inequalities in the standard of services. Why shouldlocal 
differences in taxing power influence the size of the block grants, whereas 
differences in private donations should not? 
Howe'\l'er, the point is that the private donors normally want to earmark their 
donations to specific purposes and often also to specific locations. If their 
donations are set off against the bloc.l< grants I then these donations will come to 
benefit the economy of the Central Government or be spread evenly to all the local 
authorities in the country. Quite contrary to the intentions of the donors. 
Under such conditions we can expect the private donations to disappear, if they 
are set off against the block grants causing a drastic decline in the level of 
services in many local areas without improving the level of services in other areas. 
Whether we like it or not , educational and health services \vill continue for many 
years to be dependant upon continued support from NGOs. 
Local donations should have no influence on the size of the block grants given 
from the Central Government to individual local authorities. 
Regarding the donations given from foreign donors to the Central Government for 
specific purposes, I come to the same condusion. This is self evident as regards 
those donations which are given for specific purposes that have nothing to do with 
local services. 
A few donations, however, have to do with local projects which alternatively could 
be financed by the local authorities. Examples of this may be irrigation projects, 
3 In the attached appendix it is demonstrated by an example how the actual 
calculations can be done. 
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' the construction of important local or regional roads, hospitals or health clinics, 
even schools, etc. Such projects only differ from the previously mentioned 
services which are run be NGOs by being regulated by contracts with the central 
government. But the major point remains that the donors want the money to be 
given to specific purposes at specific localities and that they would dry out if they 
were set off against block grants or other flows of money to the local authority. 
But this should not make us forget the fact that local self determination, 
involvement and sustainability will only be won to the extent local services are 
locally paid. 
Bent Rold Andersen 
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The Basis of ths Ca&~ . 
The case is based on the assumptio::J., t ttdt there is a certain lump sum to be 
distributed among a number of districts, wr...ich -for the sake of simplicity- is 
restricted to 5. This simplification, however, does not affect the formula used. 
The size of the lump sum is considered given, for example as the result of a tax 
sharing procedure or a yearly decision in connection with the national financial 
budget. 
It is further assumed, that the proposal for block grant criteria, which were 
proposed by the NCG-Consultants1 , is used as the basis for the sharing of the 
lump sum: 
Table 1. Ob;lectlve Crtteria and Weights for the Shartng of Block Grants. 
1. Number of Children at School Age in 20% 
Percent of Total Population 
2. Rate of IVJortality 20% 
3. Number of Acres per Inhabitant 20% 
4. Reciprocal of total Production per Capita 40% 
Total 100% 
It should be emphasized that by means of these weights and criteria we do not 
calculate the shares of the districts, but the share per lnhabltant in each district. 
I Report of the NCG-Consultae ~s 'Decentral izat ion in e]an~a·, January 1993, par. 9.15. 
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' First Sten 1n Calculation: Establish the Data! 
The first step is to collect the data on the objective crite ria for each district and 
to organize these. We assume this has been done ; the out come being shown in 
Table 2: 
-
D:lstr1ct Nu.mbe.r 
Data 1 2 3 4 5 
Number In- 200 300 400 500 600 
hab. In thou-
sands 
Number of 4000 6000 7<k."' scoo 8000 
sq. km. 
Number of 0,02 0,02 0,0175 0,01 0,013333 
sq. km. per 
1nhab 
Production, $ 300 250 350 500 400 I per 1nhab 
Reciprocal, 0,003333 0,004 0,002857 0,002 0,0025 
prod. per 
1nhab. 
Number~ 50 100 200 125 200 I 
children at 
school age, in 
thous. 
Chlldren at 25 33¥33 50 25 33,33333 
school age, 
percent of 
1nhab 
Rate of mar- 20 15 16 13 21 
tality 1n p.m. 
~. 
From this table important s t ructures of each d istrict, which are relevant to their 
need for t r ansfers, will appear . 
To give an example: District no 1. is relatively small, which of course 
reduces its need for transfers. On the other hand, it is relatively densely 
populated, which ceteris paribus increases its need for costly infrastruc-
tures. In addition to this, it has a r elatively low production per capita, 
i.e. it has a poor populatio'!'l and therefore only limited taxing poten-
tialities, which increases its need for transfers. However , its need is 
limite d because of thf.; relatively low number of school children, but its has 
a high rate of mortality, which indicates a great need for health services 
and thereby a need for transfers . How shall these contradictory factors 
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' Third Step: Calculating Point$ for eacl)_ District by Multiplying each 
Crlterion with the Weight a~~d. 
The bottom line of the above table 3 indicates the relative need for transfers per 
inhabitant of each district provided each of the criteria had an equal weight. But 
the weights are not equal. Therefore in Table 4 we multiply each of the index 
values in table 3 by the weight of the criterion in question. Thereb y we attach a 
value - a "number of points" - to each district and criterion , indicating the 
weighted need for transfers per inhabitant: 
Table 4. Number of Points of eacp District by multiplying Index Values by 
Crt~ Weigb,ts. 
D1strlct Number 
Number of PoUlts 1 2 3 . 4 5 Total 
.. 
Number of sq. km. per 20 20 18 10 13 81 
inhab 
Redprocal , GDP per in- 40 43 34 24 30 176 
hab. 
Chlldren at school age, 20 27 40 20 27 133 
percent of tnhab 
Rate of morta.Uty in p. m 20 15 16 13 21 85 
Sum= points per 1nhab. 100 110 108 67 91 475 
Paints Total 20000 32901 43116 33501 54602 184121 
The Percentage Share 11 18 23 18 30 100 
All the points are summed up for each di..$trict in the row "Sum = Points per 
inhabitant". By multiplying these figures by the number of inhabitants in each 
districts we arrive at the total number of points for each district, which is an 
indicator of its total need for transfers. Thus the number of points per inhabitant 
is 100 for District 1, which, multiplied by 200 (thousands) inhabitants makes 
20,000 points. The total number of points for all districts makes 184,121 . The 
number of points of District 1 (20,000) makes 11 percent of t he total number of 
points for all districts ( 184,121). Thus District 1 has a claim of 11% of the total 
lump sum for block grants. The bottom line of Tabl~ows the per:centage ~ 
of each of the five J)istr1cts; and the total lump sum allocated for Block Grant will 
therefore be dist;ibuted in those proportions. 
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